Corps de l’article

The mere existence of such an international court principled, impartial and fair in its procedures and rulings - is an encouragement for people working for human rights throughout the continent.[1]

The Commissioner for Human Rights (hereinafter: “the Commissioner”) is an independent, non-judicial institution mandated to promote awareness of and respect for human rights across the 47 Council of Europe member states. In 2019, the Commissioner’s Office celebrated its 20th anniversary. 70 years ago, on 4 November 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights[2] (hereinafter: “the Convention”) was opened for signature. On this occasion, it is time to take stock of the special relationship maintained between the Commissioner and the judicial organ established by the Convention: the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: “the Court”).

I. Two Distinct but Complementary Institutions

The relationship between the Commissioner and the Court has varied considerably over time, from a clear separation of functions to increasing interactions.

A. The Creation of a New, Separate Institution: The Commissioner for Human Rights

The Commissioner’s mandate reflects a compromise resulting from lengthy debates about the specific role and functions such a new institution was to be entrusted with. The reasons behind the creation of a new institution have evolved, as have the links that such an institution should have with the Court. Paradoxically, it is when the Court became single and permanent with the entry into force of Protocol nº11 to the Convention,[3] and that the European Commission of Human Rights ceased to exist, that the idea of a commissioner finally materialized.

Back in 1972, a first proposal focused on the possible creation of a “Human Rights Ombudsman” or “European Commissioner” whose primary task would be to assist in receiving and, after preliminary investigation, bringing well-founded claims in appropriate form before the (then) Commission.[4]

In 1996, the Finnish Government relaunched the idea of a “Commissioner” who would complement or assist the Court. The rationale behind the Finnish proposal was that, with the rapid enlargement of the Council of Europe at the time, the new permanent Court would have to face an enormous workload.[5] As a result, it was suggested that the Commissioner be entrusted with three main functions[6] to ease the future workload of the Court: giving information and advice to individuals “with human rights grievances”, dealing with grievances by offering individuals a non-judicial procedure, and acting as amicus curiae on the basis of Article 36 of the Convention.[7] At the Council of Europe’s second Summit, held on 10 and 11 October 1997 in Strasbourg, the Heads of State or Government of the organization's member states adopted an Action Plan in which they welcomed the proposal to create an office of Commissioner for Human Rights to promote respect for human rights in the member states and instruct the Committee of Ministers to study arrangements for its implementation, while respecting the competences of the single Court.[8]

This decision laid the ground for the future mandate of the Commissioner with a more preventive role. However, in contrast with the Finnish proposal, it was agreed that the Commissioner should be separate from the Court, to avoid the risk of interference with the operation of the system of the Convention.

On 7 May 1999, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution (99)50[9] on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. The agreed mandate covers a broad range of activities aimed at promoting education in, awareness of and respect for human rights, as embodied in the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe. At the same time, limitations were set, and an important feature of the mandate is that the Commissioner shall not take up individual complaints. In addition, Article 1 of Resolution (99)50 stipulates that the Commissioner “shall respect the competence of, and perform functions other than those fulfilled by, the supervisory bodies set up under the European Convention on Human Rights”.[10] The Resolution 99(50) thus reflects a clear willingness to separate the two institutions: the Commissioner on the one hand, a non-judicial institution which cannot take up individual complaints, and the Court on the other hand, a judicial body tasked to deal with individual applications. This separation, however, did not mean isolation from each other in practice and did not prevent cross-references between the Commissioner and the Court from increasing over the years.

B. Cross-References and Mutual Enrichment

Article 1 of Resolution (99)50 calls on the Commissioner “to promote education in, awareness of and respect for human rights, as embodied in the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe”.[11] Unsurprisingly, the Convention became the privileged source of reference for the Commissioner’s work: since the very beginning of the mandate, almost all country reports (or letters addressed by the Commissioner to the national authorities) have mentioned the Convention and the relevant case law of the Court. In fact, the Commissioner takes the case law of the Court into account and a large part of his or her work consists of advising governments to effectively apply the existing standards.[12] One of the first reports by Alvaro Gil-Robles, following a visit to Romania, thus underlined that in the area of defamation

[…] the terms of Article 10 of the European Convention, and above all the construction placed on it by the Court, are the most suitable guides and absolutely must be central to any proposed reforms.[13]

Such references have developed over time, becoming more systematic and detailed under the second and third mandate holders. Most recently, there have been extended references to the well-established case law of the Court under, among others, Article 3 (life imprisonment),[14] Article 6 (independence of the judiciary),[15] or Article 11 (freedom of assembly).[16] The same goes for the thematic work: the Commissioner relies on international and European conventions, and in the first place the Convention and the case law of the Court, when making recommendations to member states. The Commissioner has for instance highlighted the general principles developed by the Court for the effective investigation of complaints against the police that engage Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in an Opinion[17] and reflected on the major case law of the Court on enforced disappearances in an Issue Paper.[18]

A question has arisen as to whether the Commissioner should limit him or herself to the Convention standards and the case law of the Court. The answer has been negative, and in some instances, recommendations made by the Commissioner have gone further than some judgments issued by the Court. In the area of migration for instance, the Commissioner has differentiated him/herself from the Court regarding the detention of migrant children. While the Court has not considered this practice as prima facie incompatible with the Convention but sets stringent conditions on the detention of migrant children,[19] the Commissioner clearly set out the principle of non-detention in an Issue Paper,[20] a position reiterated since in a number of letters and speeches.[21] The Commissioner has also taken a diverging line from the Court regarding involuntary placements of persons with psychosocial disabilities. As for other questions affecting the rights of persons with disabilities, the Commissioner’s recommendations are based on the more advanced principles set out in the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the CRPD),[22] which has been ratified by 46 of the 47 Council of Europe member states, as well as the European Union. The Commissioner is of the view that the CRPD is the international benchmark and legal reference point in all matters pertaining to disability.[23] As a consequence, having regard to Article 14 of the CRPD (Liberty and security of the person), which states that “the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty”,[24] the Commissioner has urged member states to reform their legislation, “on involuntary placements in such a way that it applies objective and non-discriminatory criteria which are not specifically aimed at people with psychosocial disabilities, while ensuring adequate safeguards against abuse for the individuals concerned”.[25] For its part, the Court continues to refer to the minimum conditions linked to the existence of a “true mental disorder”, which have to be satisfied in order for the “detention of a person of unsound mind” to be “lawful” within the meaning of Article 5(1)(e) of the Convention.[26]

At times, the Commissioner has also had a forward-looking approach, as in the case of legal gender recognition. In an Issue Paper entitled Human rights and gender identity published in October 2009, the Commissioner adopted a stance against making legal recognition of the gender identity of transgender persons subject to irreversible sterilization surgery.[27] Eight years later, in the judgment A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, the Court found that the condition of compulsory sterilization surgery or treatment for legal gender recognition violated Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private life),[28] referring to the Commissioner’s Issue Paper.

Conversely, the Court has from the outset made references to the work of the Commissioner. Firstly, it has done so in its judgments under the section relating to the facts of the case, as an additional source of information, supplementing to a certain extent the absence of in situ visits by the Court, i.e. the limited capacity of the Court to make factual findings.[29] The Court for example referred to the Commissioner’s visit in Transnistria, during a visit to Moldova in October 2000, when looking at international reactions to the applicants’ conviction and detention,[30] and to the Commissioner’s reports on Cyprus, to assess the situation of “artistes” in Cyprus in the first case dealing with trafficking in human beings.[31] While these mentions are now a relatively stable practice in the Court’s case law, there have also been notable exceptions, in cases where the Court could have referred to or relied on the Commissioner’s reports and information, but did not.[32]

Secondly, such references have been introduced in the operative part of the judgment, in support of the Court’s line of reasoning. Major judgments in which the Court has given some weight to the Commissioner’s findings include Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary on the placement of Roma children in special schools,[33] M. v. Germany on preventive detention,[34] and Biao v. Denmark regarding the difference of treatment between those who have held citizenship as of birth and those who have obtained it later.[35] In these cases, the work of the Commissioner has generally been taken into account to substantiate the legal argumentation, leading to a conclusion of a violation of the Convention.

However, there have also been situations in which the Court departed from the Commissioner’s findings, such as in the recent case Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia regarding the authorities’ failure to ensure access to clean water and sanitation to members of two Roma communities over an extended period of time. The Court found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention[36] despite the fact that the Commissioner, in his report on his visit to Slovenia mentioned in the judgment, had insisted on the dire consequences that the absence of access to clean water has had on the Roma community.[37]

The different roles of the two institutions might explain the sometimes diverging approaches: the Commissioner includes a clear rapid response dimension and his/her field experience in member states allows him/her to put into a wider perspective the Court’s judgments. The Commissioner addresses human rights issues as they arise, whereas the Court’s procedures take longer and deal by definition with an individual case. The Commissioner is thus often confronted with situations where there is a distinct lack of case law from the Court, and he/she might give guidance to member states nonetheless to ensure they move forward. In addition, the Commissioner’s mandate is broad and does not only cover the Convention’s standards. Beyond other Council of Europe instruments, it also draws on UN instruments and soft law. As a consequence, the Commissioner may sometimes look at which instruments provide the most appropriate framework for addressing human rights issues, which is often – but not always – the Convention.

Cross-references between the Commissioner and the Court have undoubtedly enriched each other’s work, contributing to a sort of quasi-judicial dialogue, also reinforcing the findings of the Commissioner in a judicial decision, and in so doing helping the Court to make the Convention a “living instrument”.

II. The Consecration of the Institution of the Commissioner as Part of the Convention System

Without interfering with the independence of the Commissioner’s Office, the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly have both recommended to the Commissioner to take on additional responsibilities. In February 2008, the Committee of Ministers adopted a declaration on the protection of human rights defenders, inviting the Commissioner “to strengthen the role and capacity of his Office in order to provide strong and effective protection for human rights defenders”.[38] Furthermore, with the entry into force of Protocol nº14 to the Convention[39] in 2010, the Commissioner’s functions have been formally extended: the Commissioner may now on his/her own initiative exercise the right to intervene as a third-party before the Court, by submitting written comments and taking part in hearings.[40] The Protocol nº14 provides formal recognition to the institution of the Commissioner, which is expressly introduced in the text of the Convention and into the control mechanism established by the Convention, thus putting an end to the tendency to keep the Commissioner on the fringes of the system.[41] The recent amendment to Rule 9 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments,[42] allowing the Commissioner to submit communications relating to the execution of judgments to the Committee of Ministers, puts the finishing touches to its integration in the Convention system.

A. The Possibility of Third-Party Interventions in Cases Pending Before the Court

The work undertaken by the Commissioner’s Office in relation to third-party interventions is often linked to the entry into force of Protocol nº14. While the Protocol nº14 has certainly given a crucial impetus in this area, third-party interventions by the Commissioner predates the entry into force of that Protocol nº14. The possibility for the Commissioner to intervene in a case pending before the Court was for the first time activated in a group of cases concerning the transfer of asylum seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation.[43] On 9 November 2009, the Court invited by letter the Commissioner to intervene as a third-party in the Court’s proceedings in 14 cases against the Netherlands and Greece. Since a number of similar cases were pending before various Sections of the Court, with the risk of differing approaches by the Sections, a lead case was subsequently identified and relinquished to the Grand Chamber. The Commissioner was again invited to intervene as a third-party on 3 May 2010 and submitted written observations in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,[44] concerning an Afghan asylum seeker returned from Belgium to Greece. On 1 September 2010, the Commissioner also intervened orally for the first time during the hearing before the Grand Chamber of the Court in this case.

In the meantime, Protocol nº14 entered into force on 1 June 2010, giving the Commissioner the right to intervene in proceedings before the Court proprio motu. But the M.S.S. case had already paved the way for the Commissioner’s work in that area. In that case, the Court delivered a judgment[45] a few months after the hearing which had wide-ranging consequences for the protection of the human rights of asylum seekers in Europe: it recognized that the living conditions asylum seekers had to endure in Greece amounted to degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.[46] In response several member states suspended returns of asylum seekers to Greece. In this case, the Court relied extensively on the information supplied by the Commissioner, as well as other third-party interveners, to assess the situation of asylum seekers in Greece.

The first third-party intervention submitted by the Commissioner under Article 36(3) of the Convention[47] (i.e. on the Commissioner’s own initiative) was in October 2011, in the case of The Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania,[48] the first case in which the Court had to examine an application concerning a person who died before its submission, in the absence of any heir or close relative and with no legal representative. The case had been lodged by the Centre for Legal Resources (CLR) on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu, a young man of Roma ethnic origin, suffering from a severe learning disability and infected with the HIV virus, who died at the age of 18 at the Poiana Mare Psychiatric Hospital, after having spent all his life in institutions. The Commissioner argued that in exceptional circumstances, NGOs should be allowed to lodge applications with the Court on behalf of victims, even in the absence of specific authorization. As the Chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the Grand Chamber, a hearing took place on 4 September 2013, with the participation of the Commissioner.[49] In a judgment of 17 July 2014, the Court declared the case admissible, stressing, as the Commissioner did, that it was

satisfied that in the exceptional circumstances of this case and bearing in mind the serious nature of the allegations, it should be open to the CLR to act as a representative of Mr. Câmpeanu, notwithstanding the fact that it had no power of attorney to act on his behalf and that he died before the application was lodged under the Convention. To find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level with the risk that the respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention as a result of its own failure to appoint a legal representative to act on his behalf as it was required to do under national law (…). Allowing the respondent State to escape accountability in this manner would not be consistent with the general spirit of the Convention.[50]

To date, the Commissioner has intervened in a total of 25 cases or groups of cases[51] concerning 12 member states (three times under Article 36(2), and 22 times under Article 36(3) of the Convention), in which 14 judgments and several decisions have been delivered by the Court. It was during the mandate of Nils Muižnieks that the potentialities of Protocol nº 14 and of third-party interventions in general were developed, with 15 sets of written observations submitted to the Court, an exponential increase from the previous situation – and a practice which continues under the current mandate holder.[52]

The possibility of third-party interventions before the Court might have been until recently a lesser-known aspect of the mandate of the Commissioner, also raising some questions as to the criteria used for deciding whether to intervene in a case. One obvious criterion is that the intervention must bring added value. This means that the Commissioner should have first-hand information on the issues at stake, either through his/her country work or through thematic knowledge, to bring useful insights before the Court.[53]

The thematic priorities are also well reflected in the cases in which the Commissioner has intervened so far: the vast majority (11 cases) deals with human rights defenders, whom the Commissioner is specifically tasked to assist under his/her mandate.[54] This particular focus thus represented an especially important driving force for the development of third-party interventions in practice. Another group of cases (7) relates to migration issues, a topic on which all mandate holders have been very active. Finally, three cases deal with the rights of persons with disabilities, while three further cases relate to the right to freedom of expression, two important areas of work for the Commissioner.

In addition, for the Commissioner to intervene, it needs to be a case allowing him/her to illuminate a broader human rights issue, one where the general interest might be at stake and where the Commissioner’s experience “may help enlighten the Court on certain questions, particularly in cases which highlight structural or systemic weaknesses in the respondent or other High Contracting Parties.”[55] For instance, the Estemirova case[56] allowed the Commissioner to highlight the long-standing problems facing human rights defenders in the North Caucasus, while the observations submitted on a group of cases challenging the so-called “Law on Foreign Agents”[57] provided an opportunity for the Commissioner to reiterate that this law was incompatible with international and European human rights standards and that its application “has had a major ‘chilling effect’ on the work of civil society organizations in the Russian Federation”[58]. In six cases against Azerbaijan, the Commissioner underscored that these cases were an illustration of a serious and systemic human rights problem in the country, with pre-trial detention being used as a tool of punishment to silence those expressing dissenting views. In several cases concerning Turkey, the Commissioner also sought to highlight that the detention and prosecution of numerous journalists, human rights defenders and opposition parliamentarians was part of a broader pattern of repression against those expressing dissent or criticism of the authorities, and particularly of official policy on issues related to the situation in southeastern Turkey.

Such criteria have been highlighted by the successive Commissioners during their oral presentations before the Court. During the hearing in M.S.S., Thomas Hammarberg stressed that his approach had been to be “very selective” and to intervene “only in particularly important cases” where the ruling of the Court would have a broader repercussion and importance for the defense of human rights throughout the Council of Europe area. He added that he would limit himself to situations where he felt that he had something to contribute as a background to the Court’s deliberations on a particular case. In the Câmpeanu case, Nils Muižnieks underlined the importance of the case at stake, which would set the position of the Court with regard to access to justice of people with disabilities, and in the N.D. and N.T. case,[59] Commissioner Mijatović indicated that she had decided to take part in the hearing “because of the special importance this case has for the protection of the human rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.”

However, intervening is subject to two conditions. Firstly, except in cases where the Commissioner is invited by the Court to submit written comments under Article 36(2) of the Convention, the Commissioner is bound by a twelve-week deadline after the communication of a case to the authorities concerned.[60] This means that the Commissioner’s Office needs to be informed of the communication of a case in due time.[61] The Commissioner’s Office regularly follows the communication process, but the vast number of cases communicated every week makes it almost impossible to keep track of all of these cases. Nevertheless, the Office may also be informed through press releases published by the Court’s Registry for the most important cases, or through NGOs which have supported the submission of an application or by the applicants’ representatives themselves. Secondly, intervening requires human resources. The number of third-party interventions, sometimes perceived as low, can in part be explained by the resources available in the Commissioner’s Office and the fact that third-party interventions only represent an additional tool at the Commissioner’s disposal to help promote and protect human rights. The core activities of the institution remain the country visits and continuous monitoring of the human rights situation in all 47 Council of Europe member states, which means that, in practice, the Office has to be selective and strategic in its choice of interventions, which can also usefully supplement the work in the country in question.

The Commissioner’s interventions have had a mixed impact until now. Besides the two Grand Chamber judgments mentioned above, this type of intervention has especially translated into an actual greater consideration of the Commissioner’s findings by the Court in cases where the Commissioner has highlighted structural or systemic human rights problems and where the Court found a violation of Article 18 of the Convention (limitation on use of restrictions on rights).[62] In the Kavala judgment,[63] which contains numerous references to the Commissioner, the Court underlined in particular that it was also aware

of the concerns expressed by the Commissioner for Human Rights and the third-party interveners, who consider that the applicant’s detention is part of a wider campaign of repression of human-rights defenders in Turkey.[64]

The Commissioner’s findings can also be reflected in the part of the judgment concerning Article 46 of the Convention (execution of judgments). In Aliyev v. Azerbaijan,[65] the Court noted with concern that the events under examination in a number of similar cases could not be considered as isolated incidents. It added:

The reasons for the above violations found are similar and inter‑connected. In fact, these judgments reflect a troubling pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention of government critics, civil society activists and human-rights defenders through retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law in defiance of the rule of law. This pattern of the use of arbitrary detention in retaliation for the exercise of the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and association has also been the subject of comment by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (…) and other international human-rights organizations (…). The Court accordingly finds that the actions of the State stemming from this pattern may give rise to further repetitive applications.[66]

In general, third-party interventions by the Commissioner appear to draw additional attention to the case in question, signaling that he/she considers the case to be important in some way.[67] Yet, the consideration by the Court of the Commissioner’s observations has at times been less visible, if not inexistent. This might be due to the existence of a now well-established case law,[68] or to a more cautious approach on certain issues. In 2019, the Court issued for instance a judgment in the case of Stoian v. Romania,[69] concerning access of a young student with a physical disability to mainstream education in Romania. The Court, ruling as a committee of three judges, rejected all claims. The Commissioner’s submission insisted on the need to interpret the Convention in the light of the rights and principles enshrined in the CRPD, stressing in particular that “reasonable accommodation is an individual right, which must be directly implemented without undue delays”.[70] The Court’s assessment stands at odds with that of multiple interveners, including the Commissioner, as it frames the right to reasonable accommodation in education as a matter of state policy.

Equally in 2019, the Court rendered inadmissibility decisions regarding cases related to events which occurred in 2015 in the context of counter-terrorism operations and curfews in southeastern Turkey,[71] in sharp contrast with the concerns expressed by the Commissioner in the submission regarding the grave allegations of human rights violations committed in southeast Turkey during the curfews and the erosion of judicial independence and the increasing interference by the executive in the judiciary in Turkey.[72]

Lastly, in the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, in relation to two complaints concerning alleged summary returns of migrants from the Spanish city of Melilla to Morocco, the Grand Chamber also took a different view from the Commissioner, who had argued along the lines of the Chamber judgment and pointed to the existence of a practice whereby migrants who attempt to enter Melilla in groups by climbing the fence surrounding the city are summarily returned by Spain’s border guards to Morocco.[73] According to the Commissioner, these returns take place outside of any formal procedure and without identification of the persons concerned or assessment of their individual situation, a circumstance which prevents them from effectively exercising their right to seek international protection in Spain. The Court, however, expanded the circumstances in which member states may return a person apprehended whilst trying to cross a border without an individual examination of his or her situation and found no violation of Article 4 of Protocol nº4 to the Convention (prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens).[74]

But even in cases where the Court adopted a different position from the Commissioner or decided to strike out the applications, the Commissioner’s submissions have appeared to carry some weight in circles beyond the Court. For instance, the written observations submitted in two cases against Austria challenging Dublin’s returns to Hungary[75] have been used by domestic courts in some countries to decide on concrete cases involving such returns.[76]

B. The Role of the Commissioner in the Process of Execution of the Court’s Judgments

The prevention of human rights violations is one of the cornerstones of the Commissioner’s mandate.[77] As many judgments delivered by the Court bring to light certain systemic problems in the member states concerned, it is the Commissioner’s role to encourage the rapid and effective execution of these judgments and to assist the governments in their efforts to remedy these shortcomings (in law or practice) with a view to preventing further similar violations.[78] The successive Commissioners have therefore tried to play their part when it comes to the execution of the Court’s judgments.

Of course, the Commissioner’s role can only be complementary to the main dialogue, which takes place between member states within the Committee of Ministers. However, when travelling to the member states, the Commissioner has in many instances insisted on the importance of executing the Court’s judgments and of implementing reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of repeat applications. This might happen in the framework of bilateral meetings with government representatives or publicly in country reports and letters. In some cases, Nils Muižnieks specifically selected problems that were at the origin of repetitive applications before the Court as themes for certain country reports, e.g. length of proceedings in Italy, the administration of justice in Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, counterterrorism measures and freedom of expression in Turkey.[79]

In other cases, the Commissioner may address the execution of a judgment as part of a more general examination of a specific human rights issue. The Commissioner has done so in reports on the Czech Republic,[80] which focused inter alia on the human rights of Roma, and in which the Commissioner discussed the execution of the D.H. judgment[81] which condemned the Czech Republic for the segregation of Roma children in schools. Similarly, in various reports on Azerbaijan, dealing notably with the issue of freedom of expression, the Commissioner insisted on the need to decriminalize defamation and amend the law on defamation, a measure which is also required in order to execute two judgments issued by the Court against Azerbaijan in 2008 and 2010.[82]

On occasion, the Commissioner has sought to raise awareness regarding pilot judgments, which are particularly important. In its Resolution (2004)3,[83] the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited the Court “to identify, in its judgments finding a violation of the Convention, what it considers to be an underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem, in particular when it is likely to give rise to numerous applications” and “to specially notify” these judgments not only to the state concerned and to the Committee of Ministers, but also to the Parliamentary Assembly, to the Secretary General and to the Commissioner.[84] Since the inception of the pilot-judgment procedure, the idea was thus to involve the Commissioner with the expectation that the systemic problems unveiled by this procedure become a priority in the continuous dialogue between the Commissioner and the member state in question. The case of Kurić and Others v. Slovenia[85] provides a good example of the Commissioner’s involvement in a pilot case. The Commissioner has addressed the issue of the “erased” in Slovenia on a number of occasions and addressed recommendations to the government in order to remedy the situation, before but also more intensely after the Court delivered its pilot judgment.[86] In 2013, Nils Muižnieks was also invited to engage with a UK Parliamentary Committee by submitting his views on the UK’s non-implementation of the Hirst (nº2) and Greens and M.T. (pilot) judgments concerning voting rights for prisoners,[87] an issue already raised by his predecessor.

The amendment introduced in 2017 to the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments (Rule 9)[88] now allows the Commissioner to submit written comments on the execution of judgments directly to the Committee of Ministers. The Commissioner started to use this new possibility in 2020, in three cases covering issues related to access to legal abortion and women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights in Poland, one case relating to the detention of a human rights defender in Turkey and another regarding the protection of women from gender-based violence in Romania.[89] This indicates that such submissions are not limited to cases in which the Commissioner previously intervened as a third-party, and suggests that similar criteria to those used to select cases for third-party interventions also apply to Rule 9 submissions, in a manner that brings the most added value to the execution process.

Although the Committee of Ministers already took into consideration the Commissioner’s work in making assessments for the execution of judgments before the Commissioner started making submissions under Rule 9,[90] the contribution by the Commissioner to the execution of judgments in general is expected to have greater impact with this new procedure.[91] While this new channel allows the Commissioner to intervene with flexibility and on an ad hoc basis in the execution process, the Commissioner intends to continue to address issues pertaining to the execution of judgments more generally when she deems it relevant for her country or thematic work. This flexibility, along with the independence which characterizes the Commissioner as an institution, means that the Commissioner should be able to react to the most urgent situations, without any legal or political constraints.

***

The Commissioner does not operate in a vacuum[92] but within the wider context of the Council of Europe human rights protection’s system, and in particular the Convention system in which the institution now plays an important role.

In accordance with Resolution (99)50, the Commissioner pursues his/her activities while fully respecting the competence of the supervisory bodies set up under the Convention. The Commissioner’s role is complementary to and reinforces the established procedure for the control of the respect of Convention obligations and for the supervision of the execution of Court’s judgments and cannot supplant them under any circumstances. The four Commissioners who have held office since the creation of the institution have certainly contributed to a dynamic interpretation of the Convention standards, with the ultimate aim of reinforcing human rights in Europe.